[From his Commentary on Hebrews in the 1870's; a professor of Oberlin College;
close friend of Charles Finney; and editor of The Oberlin Evangelist]


In point of intrinsic importance the atonement ranks among the most fundamental doctrines of the Christian system. This intrinsic importance is still heightened by modern discussions and theories which bear forcibly, not to say vitally, upon its substantial significance, and also upon its practical moral power. no apology therefor need be made for an extended discussion of this doctrine as taught in the scriptures.


Fully aware that of the controversy on this subject is logomachy, a mere war of words, fostered if not caused by vagueness and diversity in the use of terms, I begin with definitions. I use the word atonement to signify, the provision made of God through the sufferings and death of Christ to render the pardon of penitent sinners morally safe and also wise under his moral government. A secondary aim in this scheme is to promote the repentance of sinners and their subsequent obedience.----I do not (with some) use the word in the sense of at-one-ment--a reconciliation between God and sinners, effected simply by their repentance. As I use the word "atonement," it lies back of this reconciliation, as a provision antecedent, contemplating the exigencies of God's moral government, and providing for the honor and support of law in the case of pardon.


"Pardon" in this discussion will mean the same as forgiveness, and essentially the same as justification, inasmuch as to those who are pardoned in Christ "there is no more condemnation."-----Guilt (with me) is ill-desert, blame-worthiness, and is not strictly identical with being held under law to punishment. So used, forgiveness does not extinguish guilt. The ill-desert of sin is intrinsic and therefore eternal. No mercy, no pardon, can make sin less blameworthy.


Points antecedent to atonement.


Hoping thus to make my argument more surely and fully understood, I first call special attention to some antecedent facts and considerations bearing upon the nature and necessity of the atonement. If some of these points should seem in themselves to obvious to need mention, yet in their bearings on our subject they may be too vital to be left out.


1. The atonement contemplates a sinning race; is made for sinners, and not the unsinning. Remotely as revealing God, it may affect unsinning races; but directly, its provisions are only for sinners.


2. It presupposes a moral law, enjoined by God and broken by men; for, sin is nothing more or less than the transgression of such moral law. Hence the atonement, having to do with sin and its forgiveness, must have to do with this broken law, and consequently must have governmental bearings and relations. It could be nothing if there were no moral government of God, and therefore it must be, in a thoroughly vital sense, a governmental scheme. The objection sometimes brought against recognizing any governmental idea or element in the scheme of atonement is, therefore, baseless, because it rests on a total misconception of things entirely fundamental to the atonement.


3. Moral beings (like man), made for responsible moral action, have, in their very nature and relations to God, unmeasured capabilities for self-wroght blessedness or self-wrought ruin. Coupling together such innate moral powers with such relations to their infinite Maker and Lord, they must inevitably work out an eternal destiny of either bliss or woe.----Now God has assumed the immense responsibility of giving existence to such beings. This carries with it the responsibility of doing the utmost he wisely can to promote their right-doing and its resulting blessedness; to shield them against temptations to wrongdoing; to reclaim the fallen ones if, safely and wisely, he can; and in general to govern all moral races for the interests of each, and each in the interests of all.


These facts and considerations set forth the functions of moral law--its place and work in a system of moral government. God could by no means do justice to himself if he should fail to enact, impose and sustain a moral law over his intelligent moral subjects. Their well-being is so thoroughly in his keeping, his responsibilities for it are so great, that he is morally bound to make known to them the path to life, and to press them with the highest possibly motive to right-doing and it consequent blessedness.-----For this end it is requisite that he not only reveal to them a perfect law, but that he sustain and enforce it with the most impressive sanctions. The force of its sanctions is the measure of its potency and of its wisdom. Law without sanctions is not law at all. It would be at the utmost only advice. Considering the responsibilities God has assumed in giving existence to moral agents, and the momentous issues involved in their right action, his intelligent children could scarcely respect him if he had given them only advice. Issues so fearful, so momentous, demand the strongest expressions of his will and his utmost influence. He therefore holds himself sacredly bound to give his law the moral force of infinite sanctions.


At this point the question arises: Is it both wise and kind in the Supreme Ruler to make the penalties of his law so severe? Many men do ask: Why should He depend so much on threatened suffering rather than on promised reward?


Let us meet this question. Consider that both human law and divine have to deal with the same depraved human nature. What is wise, therefore, in human law should be presumed to be not less so in the divine.-----As to human law, the great Blackstone puts most common sense into fewest words in this way: "Human legislators have for the most part chosen to make the sanctions of their laws rather vindicatory than remunerative; i.e., to consist rather in punishments than in rewards" . . . "because the dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human action than the prospect of good." "of all the parts of a law, the most effectual is the vindicatory." For it is but lost labor to say, "do this," or "avoid that," unless we also declare: "This shall be the consequence of your non-complience." "Rewards in their nature can only persuade and allure; nothing is compulsory but punishment."


Blackstone's doctrine might be fortified by this well-known law of moral natures: that sin is itself fearfully depraving. It perpetually works toward worse depravity, weakening the power of reason and conscience, intensifying the power of passion and lust. As men descend into this realm of deeper depravity, they become sadly obtuse to rewards. The sensibility to suffering remains almost the only point of effective appeal for law, human or divine.


This, it will be seen, involves not only the amount and force of penalty, but also the exercise of pardon. Human experience proves that the pardoning power may be so used as to break down the moral influence of law and penalty. It is thus proved before our eyes that a sense of certainty as to the execution of penalty is vital to its moral force. It would be idle for us to assume that God does not know this as well as we do--know it be true of divine law as we do of human--and see the wisdom of providing against this possible weakness in the administration of law.-----It must be assumed, therefore, that God can not deal lightly with the question of pardon. We can conceive of no question more critical than this in its bearings upon law and penalty. This is one standpoint of view from which to study the atonement if we would comprehend its nature and necessity.


It can not be amiss to say somewhat more distinctly that the bearings and issues of God's moral government over our world reach out into other worlds; onward to the final judgment; and beyond that into the eternal future of his universal kingdom. God's government of the moral universal kingdom. God's government of the moral universe is a unit, with no isolated parts, with no movements in any one sphere or world which shall never send forth their influences beyond "their original home." "We are a spectacle to angels," and are yet to be still more, at and after the final judgment. Consequently, the entire administration of God's law, including both penalty and pardon--the whole kingdom of grace--every thing involved in the salvation of sinners under the gospel--must be exemplary, i.e., freighted with moral lessons for the entire intelligent universe. Who, then, can adequately measure the vital issues of the great question of atonement? Who can appreciate the extreme delicacy of the provisions that contemplate the safe pardon of sin, and consequently involve the majesty and sustained moral power of law?


At this point it would be unpardonable not to call attention to a style of sentiment that seems to be growing upon our age, which disparages law and especially its penalty, and which, in its developed stage, seems scarcely willing to forgive the Almighty for having enacted any moral law at all. The doctrine, pushed forward more or less boldly, is that love is over against law--a vitally different principle, far more worthy of God; and, as is claimed, less repulsive to sinners and better adapted to reach their hearts. It would, in their view, be easy for one who is Almighty to manage his creatures, even the fallen, by the might of his love, if He could only persuade himself to omit the rigors of law and penalty! By such a course, He would (say they) exonerate himself from all suspicion of tyranny and severity, and undue regard to his own good, and an under-valuation of the good of his creatures.


This sentiment is wont to manifest itself in disrespect for the Old Testament as not worthy to be compared with the New, the Old belonging to the reign of law; the New to the reign of love. At best it seems to them a mistake--a case of unwisdom (if indeed the Old Testament be form God at all)--that he should think it necessary or wise or kind to treat his creatures to such a dispensation of law and exemplary retribution.


For every reason this style of sentiment deserves unqualified reprobation. It is utterly false in its assumptions, vicious in its principles, abusive to God, ruinous to sinful men. It misconceives both love and law; puts them in an unreal antagonism; and reasons on this whole subject as reckless outlaws reason against the best human governments. For, wholesome law and effective penalty are among the very highest manifestations of real love--of love in it only legitimate sense--a wise and benevolent regard for the best interests of sentient moral beings. Sin being what it is, a strong government is no mistake, no blunder; and never need to apologize for its own existence. It is simply amazing that men, otherwise sensible, should disparge, not to say traduce, God's law and its penalty, and yet seem not aware that they reason on principles which would ruin any human government.


All these considerations are in place to show that since moral agency involves the liability to sin, it involves also the natural necessity for law and penalty. They serve consequently to show that pardon, if ever granted, must not expose the Lawgiver to any misapprehension as to his hatred of sin, and his inflexible purpose to restrain it to the utmost of his power.


Two great historic facts in God's administration of his moral realm bear with force upon the points now in hand, viz.:


1. That the first falling race met their natural doom under law and its penalty. No scheme of atonement was ventured upon in their case, and no pardon was offered. As to them the revealed testimony runs: "The angels who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day" (Jude 6); "If God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell and delivered them into chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgment;" "The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished" (2 Peter 2: 4, 9). This record has not a whisper of mercy, not a hint of any atonement providing for the safe exercise of pardon. It is therefore legitimate for us to infer that God provided no atonement for them and offered no pardon, because he say it to be morally impracticable, that is to say, unsafe, unwise, and therefore not to be attempted. For surely no other reason for passing by falling angels without an atonement is even supposable. God was no less benevolent then than now; was as kindly and even mercifully disposed toward fallen angels as toward fallen men; so that no reason can be assigned for the fact of no mercy, no atonement, no offered pardon in their case, except that he foresaw it would lie dangerously open to abuse--saw therefore the necessity of first making an unmistakable demonstration of his eternal abhorrence of sin before he could wisely venture upon a scheme for pardon.

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